Background

Declared on 18 June 1948, the Emergency was the immediate response to the murder of three British planters in northern Malaya but had its roots deep in the post-war economic and political dislocation of Malaya and a sense of alienation among the Chinese community in particular. The guerrilla campaign mounted by the military arm of the MCP, which in 1949 became the 'Malayan Races Liberation Army' (MRLA), soon confronted the British authorities with a serious security problem. This was partly because of the MRLA's military effectiveness. Its origins lay in the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army, which had been formed during the Second World War.

Although the Anti-Japanese Army's resistance activities were relatively limited, and it was ostensibly disbanded following the war, its structure and much of its weaponry remained available for reactivation. At its peak in 1951 the MRLA numbered about 8000 men.

The support the guerrillas received from a segment of the Chinese community, and the acquiescence of much of the rest, was an important element in sustaining their campaign. This stemmed from discontent among Chinese over their status within the colony - the British withdrawal of proposed measures that would have offered eventual citizenship in 1946 had inflamed Chinese opinion - and from the failure of the administration to ensure law and order.

British response

The British response to the guerrilla challenge was at first marked by uncertainty and ineptitude. Not until 1950 was a more coordinated programme developed, following the appointment of the retired British army officer, Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs, as Director of Operations. He emphasised the need to separate the guerrillas from their support, both by improving the position of the Chinese community generally and by physically concentrating civilians living near guerrilla areas in 'New Villages'.

A coordinated and systematic approach, moving from south to north, was proposed. This programme was vigorously implemented by General Sir Gerald Templer, who was appointed High Commissioner with full powers over the military, police, and civil authorities in early 1952 (his predecessor, Sir Henry Gurney, had been ambushed and killed by guerrillas in October 1951). By 1954, when Templer departed, these measures had transformed the situation. The CTs (communist terrorists), as the guerrillas were now termed, had been forced back into the jungle, where they struggled to sustain themselves. From this time, the operations against them were in the nature of a mopping-up exercise.

New Zealand's early involvement

New Zealand's first involvement in Emergency operations occurred in 1949 following the deployment to Singapore of a flight of 41 Squadron's Dakotas in response to the threatening situation in Hong Kong. Attached to the British Far East Air Force, these aircraft were used, as a secondary task to their flights to Hong Kong, to drop supplies to forces engaging the MRLA. One aircraft was stationed in Kuala Lumpur to carry out this role. By the time the flight was withdrawn in December 1951, it had carried out 211 sorties, dropping 284,000 kilograms of supplies.

Several New Zealand Army officers served in Malaya while on secondment with British units from 1949. In January 1951 ten officers and fourteen NCOs also went there with 1st Battalion, Fiji Infantry Regiment. Under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel R.A. Tinker initially, this unit gained a high reputation for effectiveness in operations against the guerrillas. By the time it was withdrawn in 1956 about forty New Zealanders had served with it, and two had been accidentally killed. In 1954 an RNZN frigate, HMNZS Pukaki, carried out a bombardment of a suspected guerrilla camp, while operating with the Royal Navy's Far East Fleet. This was the first of a number of bombardments by RNZN ships over the next five years.

The Far East Strategic Reserve

New Zealand became more directly involved in Emergency operations in 1955, following its decision to contribute forces to the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve. The Reserve's primary role was to deter communist aggression against South-east Asia, and to provide a capacity for the immediate implementation of defence plans in the event that deterrence failed. As a secondary role, the forces committed to the Reserve were permitted to take part in actions against the guerrillas.

The Army's initial contribution to the Reserve, a Special Air Service Squadron commanded by Major Frank Rennie which formed part of 22nd SAS Regiment, was particularly suited for such operations, which now consisted of seeking out the guerrillas in their jungle sanctuary. From April 1956 it deployed in the Fort Brooke area bordering the states of Perak and Kelantan and in a series of operations eliminated the local MRLA organisation, at a cost of one fatal casualty. During 1957 the squadron operated in Negri Sembilan in an area dubbed Mountainous by the guerrillas, between the towns of Seremban, Kuala Pilah, and Tampin. Again it was successful in destroying the local MRLA group. In 1965/6, during Confrontation, SAS squadrons mounted cross-border operations in Borneo.

RNZAF's role

Meanwhile RNZAF units in the Strategic Reserve were also operating against the guerrillas. On 1 May 1955 Vampires of 14 Squadron carried out the RNZAF's first operational strike mission since the Second World War and the first in jet aircraft. Between April 1955 and March 1958 the squadron, now equipped with Venoms, mounted 115 strike missions, which fell into two categories - 'Firedogs' (pre-planned bombing, strafing, and rocket attacks against suspected guerrilla targets) and 'Smash Hits' (immediate on-call strikes against opportunity targets in response to a guerrilla raid or 'hot' information). The Canberras of 75 Squadron, which replaced 14 Squadron in the Reserve in July 1958, were also used on bombing missions.

While the effectiveness of the air strikes against targets in the jungle was inevitably limited, they provided much valuable training experience to the pilots. In July 1955 41 Squadron, half of which was deployed in the Strategic Reserve, had resumed supply dropping operations in support of anti-guerrilla forces using the highly effective Bristol Freighter.

The end of the Emergency

From March 1958 1st Battalion, New Zealand Regiment, which had replaced the SAS Squadron in the Strategic Reserve, took part in operations designed to clear Perak of insurgents. Operating from Ipoh and later Grik, it mounted a series of deep jungle patrols. Its achievements in eliminating guerrillas were second to none among 28th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade's battalions. By the time that it was replaced by 2nd Battalion NZR in late 1959, most of the guerrillas had retreated across the border into southern Thailand. The greatly improved security situation was reflected in the official termination of the Emergency on 31 July 1960. For the next four years New Zealand infantrymen would periodically deploy in the Border Security Area as part of counter-insurgency measures. During Confrontation they helped hunt Indonesian infiltrators in Johore in 1964, and saw action on the Borneo frontier in 1965. The insurgents did not finally give up until the 1980s.

Conclusion

Fifteen New Zealand servicemen lost their lives in Malaya during the Emergency. Of these, three died as a result of enemy action. Among the casualties was the crew of a Bristol Freighter which flew into a mountain in 1956. For the New Zealand Army, with its experience of jungle warfare limited to the few small actions by 2NZEF's 3rd Division and its post-war preparations focused on the Middle East, the operations in Malaya marked a new departure. They were an important stage in the movement of the New Zealand military forces from a non-regular to a regular framework of organisation. They offered the opportunity to develop professional skills in a difficult but not too threatening operational environment, and laid the basis for effective service during Confrontation and in the Vietnam War in the 1960s.

CHRISTOPHER PUGSLEY

This essay is adapted from the Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History, Ian McGibbon (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2000).

.

Email