Greater Malaysia

Confrontation was a conflict which developed in 1963 between Indonesia and the new state of Malaysia backed by Commonwealth allies. Its origins lay in Great Britain's plans to divest itself of formal empire in South-east Asia. This would be achieved by federating the then Crown colonies in Borneo (Sabah and Sarawak), the protected state of Brunei, and the self-governing colony of Singapore with Malaya, which had been independent since 1957, and where the 12-year-long Emergency had formally ended in 1960. Formal agreement providing for a federation of greater Malaysia was reached between London and Kuala Lumpur in November 1961. Both parties agreed to establish the new state by 31 August 1963. Despite relinquishing sovereignty, the British were guaranteed the continued use of their bases at Singapore by the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman.

Indonesian opposition

These plans for a greater Malaysia were strongly opposed by neighbouring Indonesia and its charismatic president, Achmed Sukarno. He complained, with particular emphasis on the continued British military presence at Singapore, that London's grant of independence was not sincere. Sukarno reasoned that Malaysia, by virtue of its intended close relationship with Britain, would become a British satellite, ultimately serving to perpetuate, rather than end, European domination of the region. In addition, opposition to Malaysia conveniently buttressed the President politically, since engaging nationalist fervour against Britain distracted Indonesian public opinion from the appalling state of the nation's economy. It came as no surprise, therefore, when the Indonesian foreign minister, Dr Subandrio, declared on 20 January 1963 that Indonesia would henceforth pursue a policy of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) against Malaysia.

Guerilla warfare

Sukarno was limited in his options for opposing Malaysia. Although equipped with modern weapons from Moscow, the Indonesian armed forces were not capable of prevailing in an open engagement with the British. Instead, Sukarno decided to encourage and support subversive movements already existing in Borneo. If allowed to develop into a major insurgency, the British might eventually be worn down into abandoning the objective of greater Malaysia altogether. By the end of 1963, this strategy increasingly involved Indonesian army regulars, posing as guerrillas, crossing the border from Kalimantan to attack the security forces in Borneo and then quickly retreating to the safety of Indonesian territory.

Areas of conflict during Confrontation, 1963-66.

British response: Operation Claret

The British responded to Confrontation in a two-pronged manner. In order to deter the Indonesians from mounting an open attack on Malaysia, substantial air and naval forces were deployed in and around Singapore. The main concern for British military planners throughout the conflict, however, was containing the insurgency in Borneo. Here the security forces were in an impossible situation. They were required to defend a frontier of approximately 1600 kilometres, in extremely dense jungle and against an enemy who could retreat to the safety of Indonesian Kalimantan. Increasingly frustrated, Major-General Sir Walter Walker, director of operations in Borneo, requested permission to pursue the guerrillas across the border. After considerable debate, London finally agreed in April 1964.

The objective of cross-border operations, code-named Claret, was to wrest the initiative from the enemy. Accordingly, starting in May that year, predominantly SAS troops, operating in groups of four, regularly patrolled territory immediately across the border. When a patrol discovered enemy guerrillas moving towards Borneo, it would arrange for them to be ambushed as they crossed the border.

Britain requests support

This strategy, both regarding deterrence and military operations, was remarkably successful in containing the insurgency to a low level of conflict. Nonetheless, it required a considerable deployment of Britain's limited resources and manpower. By early 1965, for example, Britain had more than 60,000 servicemen deployed in the region, together with a surface fleet of more than eighty warships, including two aircraft-carriers. It was not surprising, therefore, that, starting in December 1963, repeated requests were made by the British for New Zealand (and Australia) to send combat forces into Borneo to assist in containing the insurgency.

New Zealand refuses to send troops

In responding to these requests the National administration led by K.J. Holyoake had to weigh carefully certain countervailing policy considerations. On the one hand, there was no disagreement that Malaysia should be supported. In both official and public eyes, Indonesia had committed clear and frequent acts of aggression against the new state. On the other hand, however, Wellington was eager to avoid New Zealand becoming embroiled in a major war with Indonesia. Policy-makers realised that, in the event of considerable bloodshed, New Zealand's relations with its closest Asian neighbour could be poisoned for generations to come. Consequently, the government initially refused to send troops into Borneo, arguing that  British and Malaysian forces already stationed there were sufficient to deal with the problem.

NZ drawn in by Malay peninsula attack

Deeply frustrated by the failure of Confrontation to make any real headway, Sukarno decided in mid 1964 to intensify it by extending military operations to the  Malay peninsula. On 1 September, ninety-eight Indonesian paratroopers landed just north of Labis in Johore. One of the few available Commonwealth units in the area was 1st Battalion, RNZIR, which, with Wellington's permission, was used to hunt down the infiltrators, most of whom surrendered without a struggle. Later, on 29 October, the New Zealanders were involved in a similar operation to capture a small amphibious force  which had landed at the mouth of the Sungei Kesang River north-west of Muar. In addition to these activities,  the RNZAF's 14 Squadron, consisting of six Canberra bombers, was deployed to Singapore, where it remained as part of the Commonwealth's air power deterrent until the end of Confrontation.

Holyoake agrees to send limited force

Sukarno responded to these failures by substantially increasing the flow of insurgents crossing the  border into Borneo. With Britain's military resources stretched to almost breaking point, the New Zealand government believed it could no longer decline the genuine appeals for assistance coming from London. On 1 February 1965 the Prime Minister announced that a small Special Air Service detachment, together with the 1RNZIR, would be deployed in Borneo as soon as possible. In addition, New Zealand crews would man two former Royal Navy minesweepers, renamed HMNZS Hickleton and Santon, which would join the frigate HMNZS Taranaki in patrolling Malaysian waters around the Malacca Strait.

During late February the 1st Ranger Squadron NZSAS, comprising about forty men under the command of Major W.J.D. Meldrum, began its tour of duty. They were replaced by a similarly sized detachment, commanded by Major R.S. Dearing, in October the same year. Both detachments took part in Claret operations alongside Britain's 22nd Regiment SAS. 1RNZIR, commanded by Colonel R.M. Gurr, was not deployed in Borneo until May 1965, when it relieved a Gurkha battalion in Sarawak. In a series of skirmishes, it inflicted substantial losses on the enemy without suffering any fatal casualties. Relieved during October, lRNZIR returned to its base in Malaya. By the time it was redeployed to Borneo in May 1966, Confrontation had all but ended.

Indonesian coup ends Confrontation

On 1 October 1965 a group of army officers made an unsuccessful attempt to seize power in Jakarta, but the uprising was ruthlessly crushed by troops loyal to Major-General Suharto. This event heralded a major transformation in Indonesian politics. Increasingly, Sukarno became a paper President, with real power being exercised by Suharto and the army establishment. These generals, concerned with restoring economic stability and suppressing the Indonesian communist party, were determined quietly to abandon Sukarno's radical agenda, particularly the Confrontation. As a result, military activity in Borneo by Indonesian insurgents subsided drastically after the coup. During its second deployment, for example, lRNZIR did not engage the enemy at all. On 11 August 1966 representatives of Indonesia and Malaysia signed a peace treaty in Bangkok. Hostilities were officially at an end. lRNZIR completed its withdrawal from Borneo in October the same year.

JOHN SUBRITZKY

This essay is adapted from the Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History, Ian McGibbon (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2000).

.

Email